Der offizielle Titel des Amts von Dellinger ist „The Special Counsel of the Office of Special Counsel“; Aufgabe seiner Behörde ist u.a., „to provide support for whistleblowers and isn’t related to the prosecutions of Trump during Biden’s presidency by a lawyer with a similar title“ (bloomberg.com vom 19.02.2025).
Am Ende seines Arbeitstages am Freitag, den 7. Februar erhielt Dellinger vom Director of Presidential Personnel Office folgende mail, mit der die heutige Entscheidung des District Court beginnt:
„On behalf of President Donald J. Trump, I am writing to inform you that your position as Special Counsel of the US Office of Special Counsel is terminated, effective immediately. Thank you for your service[.]“
Einfach-gesetzlich ist aber bestimmt:
„The Special Counsel may be removed by the President only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.“ [5 USC 1211 (b) – vorletzter Satz]
In der mail waren aber weder die einfach-gesetzlich in Betracht kommenden noch andere Gründe für die Entlassung genannt. Die heutige Gerichtsentscheidung endet mit folgendem Satz:
„For all of the reasons set forth above, the Court will enter judgment in favor of plaintiff on Count One [zu den weiteren Counts siehe S. 3, FN 2 der Entscheidung], and it will award the declaratory and injunctive relief set forth in the accompanying order.“ (siehe auch dort [2 Seiten])
Zwischen den beiden Seiten mit den beiden zitierten Sätzen liegen 65 Seiten Begründung für die Gerichtsentscheidung. Die Trump-Regierung hatte die Auffassung vertreten, die einfach-gesetzliche Norm sei verfassungswidrig, da sie die präsidialen Kompetenzen unzulässig beschränke. Sie kündigte sogleich nach der Entscheidung des District Court an, sich an den Appeal Court zu wenden. Dieser könnte auf Antrag entscheiden, die heutige Entscheidung bis zu seiner eigenen Entscheidung außer Vollzug zu setzen. Sollte ein solche Antrag gestellt und abgelehnt werden, dürfte sich der Supreme Court alsbald erneut (siehe unten) dem Fall zu befassen haben.
Die heutige Entscheidung ist eine Hauptsache-Entscheidung für die erste Instanz: Dellinger hatte zunächst eine „temporary restraining order“ (TRO) (sozusagen ‚Eil-Eil-Rechtsschutz‘) erfolgreich beantragt. Etwas später beantragte er zusätzlich eine „preliminary injunction“ (‚Eil-Rechtsschutz‘). Das Gericht entschied mit Zustimmung von Dellinger und der Trump-Regierung die „motion for a preliminary injunction with consideration of the merits“ – also die Entscheidung über den ‚Eil-Rechtsschutz‘ mit der Hauptsachen-Entscheidung – zu verbinden.
Gegen die „temporary restraining order“ hatte sich Trump sowohl – erfolglos – an den Appeal Court als auch an den Supreme Court gewandt. Letzterer entschied bloß -, aufgrund der kurzen Geltungsdauer der TRO – das Regierungs-Anliegen in der Schwebe zu lassen (also weder für noch gegen die Regierung zu entscheiden, aber die TRO bestehen zu lassen). Die TRO war ursprünglich bis Mittwoch, den 26. Februar befristet; am Mittwoch wurde die TRO bis heute verlängert (siehe taz-Blogs vom 26.02.2025), aber auch dies führte nicht mehr zu einem Eingreifen des Supreme Court (vgl. 1 und 2)
Die – nicht mit einer Überschrift versehen – Einleitung der heutigen Gerichtsentscheidung reicht bis Seite 6. Auf Seite 4 bis 6 findet sich eine Zusammenfassung der Begründung der Entscheidung. Diese Zusammenfassung sei im folgenden wörtlich zitiert:
„The Court finds that the statute [das Gesetz, das 5 USC 1211 (b)] enthält] is not unconstitutional. And it finds that the elimination of the restrictions on plaintiff’s removal would be fatal to the defining and essential feature of the Office of Special Counsel as it was conceived by Congress and signed into law by the President: its independence. The Court concludes that they must stand.
A review of both the statutory provisions setting out the powers and functions of the Office of Special Counsel, and the history of the legislation establishing the Special Counsel’s position and the terms of his tenure, reveals that his independence is inextricably intertwined with the performance of his duties. The Special Counsel’s job is to look into and expose unethical or unlawful practices directed at federal civil servants, and to help ensure that whistleblowers who disclose fraud, waste, and abuse on the part of government agencies can do so without suffering reprisals. It would be ironic, to say the least, and inimical to the ends furthered by the statute if the Special Counsel himself could be chilled in his work by fear of arbitrary or partisan removal.
Moreover, striking down the removal provision in the statute is not necessary for any of the reasons that have animated the invalidation of similar restrictions in the past. This Court’s ruling that the attempt to terminate the Special Counsel was unlawful is entirely consistent with the decisions reached and the legal framework set forth in the Supreme Court’s most recent opinions on this subject: Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and Collins v. Yellen.
First, those cases do not require a finding that the removal protections on the Special Counsel are unconstitutional because they expressly acknowledge that the Office of Special Counsel is not at all comparable to the agencies they were addressing.
Second, and more importantly, this case does not present the affront to the President’s Article II authority that those did. What troubled the Court in both Seila Law and Collins were restrictions on the President’s ability to remove an official who wields significant executive authority. The Special Counsel simply does not. He cannot bring a case in court on behalf of the United States, impose a disciplinary sanction on behalf of the United States, demand payment on behalf of the United States, promulgate a regulation on behalf of the United States, or issue a decision on behalf of the United States. While he may perform some typically executive functions, such as conducting investigations, he has no power to enforce his own subpoenas or to overcome other agencies’ objections to his requests for records. If an inquiry reveals wrongdoing, he cannot bring a complaint or call for corrective action himself; he must petition a multi-headed quasi-judicial agency, or the appropriate administrative agency under Presidential control itself, to do so. They are free to turn him down.
The Special Counsel acts as an ombudsman, a clearinghouse for complaints and allegations, and after looking into them, he can encourage the parties to resolve the matter among themselves. But if that fails, he must direct them elsewhere. And along the way, while he is required to inform the President of certain findings, the statute also specifically directs him to report directly to Congress.
This is not significant executive authority. It is hardly executive authority at all.
Finally, the underlying assumption of Seila Law and Collins is that a President necessarily operates through his executive agencies as he performs his duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. Therefore, the President must be able to not only choose, but also remove, agency heads, because their jobs entail serving as an extension of his own executive authority.
Plaintiff does not take issue with that proposition either. But he maintains that the Special Counsel is unique in that he cannot be characterized in that manner. The Office of Special Counsel is not assigned responsibilities that include furthering the administration’s agenda; it is the Special Counsel’s job to look into and shine light on a set of specific prohibited practices so that the other bodies, in the appropriate exercise of their constitutional authority, can take whatever action they deem to be appropriate. To do this as Congress intended that he should, he must remain entirely free of partisan or political influence, and that is why the statute survives scrutiny even under the most recent precedent.
In sum, it would be antithetical to the very existence of this particular government agency and position to vindicate the President’s Article II power as it was described in Humphrey’s Executor: a constitutional license to bully officials in the executive branch into doing his will.“
(Hyperlinks hinzugefügt)
Der Rest der Entscheidung (ab Seite 7) gliedert sich dann wie folgt:
BACKGROUND (S. 7 – 28)
- A. Legislative History (S. 7 – 19)
- B. Statutory Background (S. 19 – 24)
- C. Factual Background (S. 24 – 25)
- D. Procedural History (S. 25 – 28)
STANDARD OF REVIEW (S. 28 – 32)
- A. Motion for Preliminary Injunction (S. 28 – 30)
- B. Motion for Summary Judgment (S. 30 – 31)
- C. Motion for Permanent Injunction (S. 31 – 32)
ANALYSIS (S. 32 – 66)
I. The Court will grant summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on Count One. (S. 32 – 55)
A. The purported termination of the Special Counsel without cause violates 5 U.S.C. § 1211(b) (S. 32 – 33)
B. The statutory term of five years, protected by the removal for cause provision, is not unconstitutional (S. 33 – 55)
- 1. Neither Seila Law or Collins compel the conclusion that section 1211(b) is unconstitutional (S. 33 – 50)
- 2. The history, purpose, and nature of the statute demonstrate that independence from political or partisan interference is fundamental to the Special Counsel (S. 50 – 55)
II. The Court will grant the plaintiff’s request to impose equitable remedies in furtherance of its judgment (S. 55 – 66)
A. The Court has the authority to issue a declaratory judgment and enjoin executive officials other than the President (S. 55 – 59)
- 1. Declaratory judgment (S. 55 – 56)
- 2. Injunctive relief (S. 56 – 59)
B. The permanent injunction factors support the issuance of an injunction (S. 60 – 66)
- 1. Irreparable Harm and Inadequate Remedy at Law (S. 60 – 64)
- 2. Balance of the Equities and Public Interest (S. 64 – 66)
CONCLUSION (S. 66)
Ich habe bisher nur die Einleitung und die Zwischenüberschriften gelesen; vielleicht ergänze ich den Artikel – nach vollständiger Lektüre – im Laufe des Sonntag noch.
Siehe vor der heutigen Entscheidung zu dem Rechtsstreit
